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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2291
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0563
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001354

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/A - TOM REOTT AND EUR/RPM - RAPHAEL CARLAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
SUBJECT: GERMANY/ANA EXPANSION: MORE INFORMATION NEEDED
BEFORE U.S. REQUEST CAN BE FULLY CONSIDERED

REF: A. STATE 97991 <u>¶</u>B. BERLIN 1223

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

- $\P1$. (C) As instructed ref A, post approached officials in both the MFA and MOD to ask that Germany consider providing \$100 million per year from 2010 to 2014 in additional funding for sustainment of the expanded Afghan National Army (ANA).
- 12. (C) While open to making an additional contribution and agreeing that standing up the expanded ANA is in NATO's own self interest, German officials are reluctant to make any commitments until more information is available on the total cost of the program and the plan for achieving it. MOD Office Director for Political Military Affairs Colonel Bernd Schuett said Germany was looking forward to a concept paper that would present, in a transparent way, all the information regarding the stand-up and training of the expanded Afghan force. That would make it much easier to consider the U.S. request. (German officials made this same point when we first broached the idea of increasing the end strength of the ANA -- see ref B.)
- 13. (C) Noting that an additional \$100 million per year would represent a significant increase (about 15 percent) in what the MOD already spends for the Bundeswehr's deployment in Afghanistan, Schuett thought such a large contribution would be a hard sell to the Bundestag, especially among parliamentarians who believe that the ISAF approach is already too military-focused. He argued that the MOD budget is very tight, so there was no way the MOD could make such a contribution out of hide. It would need support from other ministries. He noted that MOD was already having trouble financing new ANA infrastructure in the north (barracks in Feyzabad and a training center in Mazar-e-Sharif) from its current budget.
- 14. (C) Schuett and MFA ISAF Action Officer Lukas Wasielewski also put down a marker that the Bundestag would probably raise objections to making a lump-sum contribution to a trust fund, preferring to have more control over how the money is spent. While this was probably not insurmountable, it would not be easy. Schuett wondered if NATO common funding might be appropriate to cover some the ANA costs, and said Germany might find it easier to contribute equipment in-kind (old weapons, vehicles, uniforms, etc.) to the ANA than making a big lump-sum financial contribution. He noted that Germany had followed this approach in supporting the stand-up of the

Kosovo Security Force (KSF). TIMKEN $\ensuremath{\mathsf{JR}}$